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Essay by Raisha Kasaju
“Living in the Dark in Nepal”
I proposed my economics senior thesis on electricity shortage in Nepal which was entitled ‘Living in the
Dark in Nepal’. Since the research was on a foreign third world country that lacked many published
work, I had great difficulty finding any articles and data on it at the beginning. However, my queries
were resolved by Luke Vilelle, a librarian at the Hollins Wyndham Robertson Library. It was him who
helped me initiate my thesis research.
At the beginning of the research, I was debating whether to continue on the same topic as I had
not found any research methods other than a few databases and sources that had limited information
on Nepal which were minimally related to my research topic. After Luke walked me through research
means such as various databases and several other options under course guides, I was able to pool
together a good amount of information which was encouraging and at the same time involved me more
on the topic. Thus, I decided to make it my final topic.
I used all the research sources highlighted by the Hollins library on its website. Apart from the
library’s online resources, I also received multiple opportunities to gain knowledge through examples of
previous senior theses that the library had in reserve. Along with my thesis advisor, those theses copies
also gave me ideas on how to frame thesis statements and organize ideas.
Nepal’s electricity situation remains to be a problem since many years, but it has not been well
addressed. So, it was a challenging task to be able to find reliable sources. On rare occasions when I
could not find articles at the Hollins library, the Interlibrary Loan (ILL) system offered by the library
proved to be imperative for the success of my thesis work. This allowed me access to a broader range of
information from libraries at other universities and institutions. ILL proved to be a useful means to find
journal articles, which were relevant and reliable sources for my thesis.
While working on my senior research, I learned that all the sources may not be reliable to be
used in our work. Therefore, it is important to be judicious and also consult librarians as they have a
wider range of ideas regarding research sources. From my experience, I realized that with proper
guidance to make use of the library resources, one can find sufficient information to tackle any kind of
research topic.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This thesis will look at the problem of electricity shortages in Nepal. We will consider the
time frame from 1992 until present because the country initiated policies aimed at energy
sector privatization starting from that year. Until 1992, Nepal’s electricity generation,
transmission and distribution depended solely on Nepal Electricity Authority (henceforth NEA),
a government owned and controlled grid. Since hydropower is the major source of the
country’s energy mix, Private Sector Participation (henceforth, PSP) in the electricity sector will
refer to private investment in the production of hydropower in Nepal. The introduction of PSP
in the hydropower industry has given rise to varying scales of private hydropower projects.
However, NEA still holds a vertical monopoly because it continues to be a vertically integrated
electricity grid, where there are multiple electricity generators, including PSP, but a single
supplier of electricity – the NEA. The private sector participants, also known as the Independent
Hydropower Producers (henceforth, IPP)i, are required to sign Power Purchase Agreements
(henceforth, PPA) with the NEA in order to sell their electricity. There is an exception for the
cases of hydropower plants with installed capacity up to 1,000 KW in rural areas where the
national grid’s transmission lines are not accessible. According to the International Energy
Agency (henceforth, IEA), as of 2009, only 43.6% of the total households had access to
electricity.ii This thesis hypothesizes that increased PSP in the electricity sector will help Nepal
increase its electricity supply. It is to be made clear that increased electricity privatization
means adding private resources to the already existing national grid’s power supply, rather
than replacing it.
7

The NEA’s 2009 annual report revealed a significant annual increase in the country’s
overall energy demand: from 3,490 GWH in 2008 to 3,859 GWH in 2009. Out of 2009’s total
electricity demand, only 3,130.77 GWh were met and the remaining 728.23 GWh had to be
declared as the load shedding hours – electricity shut down due to demand exceeding supply, in
order to save the entire electricity distribution system from failing. It is important to note that
88.32% of Nepal’s electricity demand in 2009 was satisfied through hydropower: 58.76%
contributed by the NEA hydro, 29.56% by the purchase from Nepal’s IPPs, 0.29% by the NEA
thermal, and the remaining 11.38% by energy imported from India.iii
Since the electricity demand has been exceeding the supply in Nepal, we will look at
how NEA’s hydropower projects have performed so far in an effort to meet the demand. After
this, our attention will shift toward the need to attract domestic as well as foreign private
investment into the country’s electricity generation, management and distribution. We will
briefly consider various approaches to electricity privatization. Since the majority of the
Nepalese population resides in rural areas, which lack even greater access to electricity
compared to urban areas, a good deal of the discussion and subsequent empirical analysis will
center on the possibilities of private investment towards Rural Electrification (henceforth, RE).
The empirical chapter in this thesis includes a series of case studies on Nepal’s two of
the private hydropower projects - a micro-hydropower focusing on rural electrification and a
medium-scale hydropower project. For the micro-hydropower project, we will compare results
from its Cost-Benefit Analysis (henceforth, CBA), to the profitability results provided by the
article mentioned in chapter 3.2. The medium-scale project will show indirect benefits of
private hydropower projects, and the last article in the empirical chapter will show the strength
8

of private ownership on affecting efficiency and profit levels. We will suggest a level of
government intervention that may still be required to encourage more PSP in the country’s
hydropower industry.

CHAPTER 2: HYDROPOWER AND THE CASE FOR PRIVATIZATION
2.1 Hydropower as the Most Suitable Source to Fulfill Nepal’s Electricity Needs
Hydropower is a renewable source of energy. It is derived from the stored energy in
water that flows from a higher to a lower elevation due to the earth’s gravitational force. There
are three main types of hydropower systems. One of them is impoundment which requires the
use of dams. The other is the run-of-river system which extracts a portion of the total energy
contained in the flow of water; this does not require dams. The last one is a pumped storage
system, which during periods of low electricity demand, pumps water from a source to a
storage reservoir located at a higher elevation. During periods of peak electricity demand,
water is released from the reservoir, thus producing electricity as the stored water converts
into hydraulic or kinetic energy. All three systems follow a common process. The water flowing
from a higher elevation turns the blades of turbines placed at a lower elevation. These turbines
then rotate electric generators, from which the generated electricity is passed on to
transmission lines. Finally the systems produce usable electricity.iv
Since hydropower in Nepal, due to its feasibility, is mostly used to produce electricity,
we will use hydropower and hydroelectricity interchangeably. Out of Nepal’s total hydropower
potential of 83,000 MW, it has been found that 43,000MW is technically and economically
9

viable.v However, during the fiscal year 2008/09, for the first time in a century long history of
electricity generation and consumption, the Nepalese government declared a “National
Electricity Crisis” in Nepal.vi In conclusion, we will sum up the reasons as to why the nation is
facing this crisis despite the fact that energy sector privatization efforts have been in place since
1992.
Hydropower is the most feasible way for Nepal to increase its electricity generation
since it lacks other significant sources of conventional energy such as nuclear energy and fossil
fuels. As of 2,000, the annual cost of importing fossil fuels averaged to about 25% of the
country’s export earnings.vii Thus, it does not make sense to spend so much for electricity
purposes when Nepal already has a noteworthy hydropower potential. Furthermore, it should
be noted that more than 80% of Nepal’s terrain is hilly, and more than 6,000 small rivers and
rivulets are flowing southwards, thus giving more occasions to run of river hydropower
projects.viii Other reasons behind the choice of hydropower to develop the country’s energy
sector are discussed below.
Empirical findings have found that per capita energy consumption, particularly
electricity, is the stimulating input for enhancing economic growth.ix We would expect that
while higher energy consumption may result in higher economic growth, this growth, in turn,
may lead to further increases in the rate of energy consumption to keep up with the increased
economic growth. Thus, if Nepal wants its economy to grow steadily, then it should give priority
to a reliable source of energy – hydropower. It has been suggested that even under a high
economic growth rate scenario of about 12% per annum, peak power demand will reach only
3,400 MW and energy requirement of 16,000 GWh by 2020.x These estimates suggest that
10

Nepal’s revealed hydropower potential is more than enough to keep up with the growing
economy. Here, we claim that it is possible to reach this potential with additional PSP in the
country’s power sector.

2.2 The Need of PSP in Nepal’s Electricity Market
Based on the conjectures and claims raised under the previous subsection 2.1,
hydropower plants can help Nepal increase its electricity supply, but how efficiently this can be
done is still a major concern. Using the results from Data Envelopment Analysis (henceforth,
DEA), we will assess the performance of hydropower plants owned and controlled by the NEA.
DEA is an efficiency modeling approach that analyzes input-to-output ratios for decision making
units, in this case – hydropower plants.xi Here, we use the input-oriented DEA that focuses on
reducing inputs by maintaining a constant level of output. Since this method focuses on the
management of inputs, it only shows efficiency on the electricity generation sector. This
particular DEA has revealed efficiency levels for fourteen NEA-owned and operated
hydropower projects over the period 2001-2004.
The results show that the average technical efficiency of hydropower plants of NEA
remains around 74%. Technical efficiency in this model refers to the relationship between the
physical quantities of resources used to produce a physical unit of output. This result suggests
that those hydropower plants could reduce their inputs, such as the number of employees, and
thus minimize the costs of Operation and Management (henceforth, O&M) by 26% without
reducing their outputs. NEA, which is a decentralized unit owned and controlled by the
11

Nepalese government, works under the supervision of the Ministry of Water Resources
(henceforth, MOWR). Due to the partial decisions of the country’s politicians and top-level
government authorities, NEA remains one of the most poorly managed and overstaffed electric
public utilities in the world.xii Over-staffing should not be a problem with private firms’ cases
because those profit-oriented investors try to minimize their costs as much as possible,
including, but not limited to unnecessary labor costs. The technical efficiency could also be
improved through increased Research and Development (henceforth, R&D) on production
plants and methods. Also, providing necessary on-the-job training to the labor force hired may
help improve labor productivity, which, in turn, would increase efficiency. However, the NEA is
not able to consider those options because it lacks financial resources.xiii
Those hydropower projects’ average scale efficiency is 71%, where a scale-efficient
hydropower plant is defined as the plant whose marginal output production is proportionate to
its marginal input. This 29% of average scale inefficiency could either be due to decreasing
returns to scale because of continued production even after the plants’ maximum capacity, or
because the production scale size has not reaped full benefits associated with potential
increasing returns to scale. Either way, more efficient production methods would help increase
those plants’ scale efficiencies. This requires improving factor productivity which is possible
through on-the-job training, and plants-upgrades with the help of technological advancements.
However, both options require more funding, which NEA lacks.
Here, an argument could be made as to why we are emphasizing on private investment
rather than any other kinds of financial assistances from foreign countries or multilateral
organizations. First of all, governments of those countries where electricity is still publicly
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provided are willing to offer financial assistance expecting a portion of the electricity in return
in order to increase the public provision to their own citizens. Other than through transmission
lines, there haven’t been any other scientific innovations regarding ways on how to store and
export energy. Hence, Nepal’s energy export is limited to its two huge neighboring economies –
China and India. However, both of those countries that are facing rise in energy demand have
deregulated their energy sectors. Thus, government assistance is not much of an expectation
from these countries. Receiving funding from non-neighboring countries is quite unlikely
because Nepal would need to use transmission lines to export its electricity. However,
extending electricity transmission lines to other foreign non-neighboring countries does not
sound economically and technically practical for Nepal. Had this been possible, then the NEA
could have easily extended its transmission lines to Nepal’s rural areas and improve rural
electrification. Moreover, foreign countries’ financial contracts to help increase Nepal’s
electricity supply tend to focus on large scale hydropower projects on international levels.
While considering funding options, attention needs to be given to Nepal’s rural electrification.
According to the NEA’s 2009 annual report, the highest percentage of electricity demand comes
from the domestic sectorxiv, and according to the World Development Indicators (henceforth,
WDI), as of 2009, 82.28% of Nepal’s total domestic households reside in rural areas.xv Thus,
incentives should be provided to private investors who consider smaller hydropower projects as
well.
Another case “for” increased electricity privatization needs the assumption that more
PSP will create a competitive electricity market. This assumption is supported by the National
Water Plan, 2005 (henceforth, NWP) which states that Nepal’s electricity sector will operate in
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a truly competitive environment with PSP.xvi Conventional economic theory suggests that
increased competition in any market leads to increased efficiency in order to survive the
competition. This will increase electricity supply. However, for competition to prevail, the
government needs to strictly limit the concentration ratio of private firms participating in the
energy sector.
Loans and grants from multilateral organizations usually have high interest rates and
other strings attached to them - as we will see in the subsection 4.1. Thus the rise in this debt
will not help the already underfunded NEA. Moreover, even those organizations have funding
limitations that does not allow them to finance only a single sector heavily.xvii This is especially
true for a small country like Nepal, where a variety of sectors even at present are
underdeveloped.
The main reason for the need of more PSP is to release the NEA from any financial
liabilities that arise from accepting loans and strings attached to grants from multilateral
organizations and other foreign countries. Financial assistances from multilateral organizations
and foreign countries may outweigh both domestic and foreign PSP. However, the bottom line
here is to help lower the financial burden that the NEA has to handle alone if left without the
liberalization of its electricity market. Increased domestic and foreign PSP in hydropower adds
electricity supply to the national grid, rather than leaving the responsibility to the already
inefficient and underfunded NEA alone.
According to the above DEA analysis concerning NEA operations, the hydropower
projects’ overall efficiency stands roughly at 50%. This figure shows that NEA’s plants are half
way away from full efficiency. Although PSP in hydropower began only from 1992, the fact that
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29.56% of NEA’s current total electricity supply is contributed by the IPPs reflects strong
evidence for the hypothesis of this thesis; that is, that increased PSP in the electricity sector
would help Nepal increase its electricity supply.

2.3 Overview of Legal Efforts to Promote Electricity Privatization in Nepal
The Nepalese government’s efforts to include private investors in hydroelectricity
production started in 1992. The Hydropower Development Policy 1992 stated that private
investors who transmit electricity to the NEA from their own substations are exempted from
income tax for ten years. xviii Those entrepreneurs can use NEA’s electricity transmission lines to
do so. Those provisions reduce the construction cost of transmission lines required to sell the
generated electricity to the NEA, and consecutive reductions in income taxes relatively increase
their profits. This act along with the Electricity Act of 1992 introduced the Hydroelectricity
Development Unit under the Ministry of Water Resources.xix This unit’s responsibilities include
promoting PSP in the hydroelectric projects and approving projects with a capacity of
1000+KW, along with providing necessary support to those private investors in the operation
and maintenance of their projects.xx The unit in general encourages and follows up with PSP in
the electricity market.
Although other policies talked about the development of private investment in
hydropower, the Hydropower Development Act of 1992 explicitly stated that one of its
objectives was to motivate the national and foreign private sector investments for the
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development of hydroelectric power.xxi The above policies were intended to attract PSP in order
to increase the electricity supply in Nepal.
Apart from the policies mentioned above, the Department of Electricity Development
(DOED) was established under the Ministry of Water Resources (henceforth, MOWR) in 1993 to
attract private sector investment to improve the electricity sector of Nepal. The DOED has been
given responsibilities to issue survey and generation licenses, to provide concessions and
incentives, to facilitate imports of the plants, equipment and goods required for projects, to
facilitate in acquiring government land required for the project, and to help in obtaining various
permits and approvals. Hydroelectricity projects that have an installed capacity greater than
1,000 KW are required to obtain a license as a permission to start and operate their work. Such
licenses are valid for up to five years for survey purposes, and up to fifty years for electricity
generation, transmission and distribution purposes.xxii No private energy project is allowed to
be nationalized as long as their licenses are valid.xxiii This is a right of the IPPs that secures their
investments. However, such rights are not free of cost; the licensees, after they start
generating electricity, are required to pay royalties to the government in Nepal (table A.I and
A.II).
NEA’s encouragement of PSP in the energy sector can clearly be noticed from the above
mentioned policies and acts. Along with opening energy privatization opportunities, NEA has
made some changes that contradict its motivation to privatize. The NEA used to exempt private
investment from tax for the first fifteen years, along with being protected from nationalization
during its license period. The taxation policy is no more applicable. This change in its policy
might negatively affect private sector involvement.
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The IPPs can sell their electricity through a Power Purchase Agreement (henceforth,
PPA) with the NEA. So, for both domestic sales as well as for foreign exports, NEA is the
ultimate authority through which electricity sales take place. The government has made
provisions with India for power exports by the IPPs. As of 2007, the electricity sales summed up
to 50 MW, and the agreements have been made to extend the export possibilities for IPPs up to
150 MW. 132 KV transmission line are available and 220 KV transmission line has been recently
identified.xxiv Thus, the private entrepreneurs will not be limited to earning only domestic sales
revenue, which is another form of incentive to attract more IPPs.
Policies to encourage PSP in Nepal’s rural areas provide comparatively more favorable
investment options to the interested private entrepreneurs. Considering the demand structure
and infrastructural conditions of rural areas in Nepal, Micro-Hydropower Projects (henceforth,
MHP) – the ones that have installed capacity of up to 100KW and Small-Hydropower Projects
(henceforth, SHP) – the ones with installed capacity of 101KW – 1MW are suitable for RE.
Hydropower projects up to 1 MW do not require licenses and do not have to pay any income
taxes on the revenue generated from electricity sales.xxv The Hydropower Development Policy
of 2001 stated that IPPs dealing with hydropower plants with an installed capacity of up to 1
MW that are not linked to the NEA are allowed to set their own electricity tariff rates
(electricity prices) to sell and distribute the electricity.xxvi This policy also stated that MHPs
would be considered for prioritized loan provision and any other required assistance.xxvii For the
sake of developing electricity in rural areas, the government allows private investments for RE
to enjoy monopoly power. Licenses are not issued to more than one private entrepreneur or
company for electricity distribution in the same area as long as the existing private investor(s)
17

are able to fulfill electricity demand for that region.xxviii Unlike the comparatively larger IPPs,
private investors of RE are exempted from having to pay energy royalty.xxix

2.4 Different Approaches to Electricity Privatization in Nepal
Once again, it is to be noted that increased PSP in Nepal’s energy sector does not mean
eliminating the public provisions that already exist. This is about increasing electricity supply,
and not about replacing the national grid by private investments. Among different types of
privatizations, one way is to lease out the government-owned and controlled electricity
substations to the interested private investors and operators. Those private entrepreneurs buy
the high voltage power and sell the electricity from there. The NEA personnel have little or no
incentive to manage the electricity substations and the equipment used for generating
electricity properly, as is the case with other publicly provided goods, because neither they own
those plant assets nor do they get any portion of the revenue earned from the electricity
supplies except for their share of salaries. This leaves little hope for future prospects of Nepal’s
electricity sector since the country heavily depends on the vertical monopoly – the NEA. Those
employees also lack the incentive to solve the electricity pilferage problems that NEA faces.
Electricity is stolen by illegally tapping from the transmission lines. This theft takes place at the
distribution phase. It is not difficult to track the pilferage. However, NEA staff is not necessarily
well-motivated to take actions against such theft. Private managements do not lack such
motivations because, other than paying NEA for the electricity drawn at the substations, they
are the ones to collect the rest of the revenue from the electricity supply allowed by the
18

maximum capacity of those substations. So, they would be motivated to invest in ways to avoid
pilferages along with investing in various scales of R&D to increase operations efficiency.
Therefore, leasing out the substations to private investors improves the substations
management along with the reduction in electricity pilferages. These improvements, overall,
could increase the hydroelectricity generated and distributed throughout the country. This
leasing technique was promoted by the Hydropower Development Policy of 1992; which stated
that the private sectors willing to operate the hydroelectric plants, transmission and
distribution lines, leased out by the government, are exempted from income tax for five years.
xxx

More than just leasing out substations, increasing the number of new private electricity
substations would help increase power supply in the long run. Managing one’s own substation
on a relatively longer basis is more effective than the one that has been temporarily leased
from the government. Although leasing out the substations supposedly tend to increase
management efficiency, the process through which the private investors purchase power from
the NEA and sell it to other individuals and businesses seems to be focusing more on electricity
marketing. Whereas, this might increase the sale of electricity and solve the management
problem temporarily during the leasing periods, the bigger problem is the lack of electricity
supply. So, in an effort to boost power supply, rather than just subcontracting PSP to manage
the already existing government-owned and operated substations, another option is to attract
more IPPs in the electricity generation sector itself. This decentralization could take place in any
of the three major phases: generation, transmission and distribution. As of 2006, Nepal’s entire
energy sector’s generation sector comprised of 21.75% of PSP, whereas the transmission and
19

distribution sectors comprise of 0% of PSP.xxxi According to the latest NEA annual report, PSP in
electricity generation has increased to 29.56%, whereas the transmission and distribution
remains to be under NEA’s control. Opening up the electricity generation sector to private
investors, both domestic and foreign, may increase the total electricity supply by way of: i)
capacity benefit – capacity (KW) of the hydropower project that can be produced at any time
on demand, and ii) energy benefit- the energy (KWh) generated by the hydropower project at a
given period of time.xxxii This privatization scheme can be operated through a ‘Build, Own,
Operate and Transfer’ (henceforth, BOOT) system. In this case, the private businesses invest
their time and funds to commence and maintain their electricity substations in order to earn
profit by selling electricity to the NEA. Since PSP has not been introduced to the country’s
transmission and distribution sectors yet, the national grid is responsible to construct grid
connections nearest to the private power stations. Once the NEA pays for the energy received
at such stations, it is solely responsible for the rest of the expenses including but not limited to
transmission and distribution losses. Under the BOOT technique, the IPPs, according to the
legally bound PPA, are required to supply a certain fixed amount of energy annually to the
NEA.xxxiii
Along with privatization, concentration ratios of the private investors should be strictly
monitored by the government. Each investor would want to earn comparatively more profit in
order to survive and excel the market competition. This goal motivates the private players in
the market to invest more in R&D in order to improve production techniques. This increased
efficiency in the production and supply could lead to further increases in the electricity supply
along with reduction in electricity prices. This electricity tariff reduction provides affordable
20

electricity to the poor population of Nepal where, according to the WDI, the per capita GNI is
only $440 as of 2009. Moreover, those profit-seeking private businesses would be able to
reinvest their retained profits, leading to further investment and progress of the hydropower
industry. For this to happen, the NEA must be willing to give up its vertical monopoly that it still
holds, and open up the energy distribution sector as well to PSP. Once again, concentration
ratios of participating firms should be limited in order to prevent any electricity price hikes.
Although increased PSP may benefit Nepal’s energy sector and electricity consumers
through increased production and management efficiency and electricity supply, respectively, it
may not be beneficial to the private investors themselves. Hydropower projects have high startup costs. Since a majority of Nepal’s labor is unskilled, regular and proper technical and
management training will add immensely to the cost. There is also a high opportunity cost
involved for the IPPs because PSP in the hydropower sector have recently begun. The first
private hydropower project ever in Nepal was delivered in the year 2000.xxxiv There are a total
number of nineteen differing private hydropower projects that are currently connected to the
national grid.xxxv Based on this small number of hydropower projects, it would be risky for the
IPPs to extrapolate conclusions about their investments.
In addition to hydropower, Nepal’s other economic sectors aren’t very developed
either. Thus, this poses higher opportunity costs to the nation itself by shifting private capital
investment from other economic sectors towards hydropower.
For the above reasons and suppositions, it sounds reasonable to expect certain level of
government interference to implement policies favorable to the PSP, and geared to reduce
market failures due to imperfect competition and potential hikes in electricity prices.
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Government assistances could be extended to the IPPs through grants and subsidies.
Alternatively, the Nepalese government could negotiate with multilateral agencies such as the
Asian Development Bank (henceforth, ADB) and the World Bank (henceforth, WB) to provide
loans to the IPPs at lower interest rates or by constructing more transmission lines in order to
facilitate electricity transfer from the private substations to the NEA.

2.5 The Need of PSP in Rural Areas of Nepal
According to the latest World Bank Development Indicators, as of 2009, 82.28% of the
total Nepalese population resides in rural areas with limited access to energy. xxxvi The IEA report
2008 reveals that 89.7% of the urban households had electricity access, whereas only 34% of
the rural households were electrified.xxxvii Due to a consistent lack of electricity, rural population
in Nepal rely on burning wood, agricultural residues, animal dung, and kerosene to meet their
cooking, heating and lighting needs. The aforementioned sources contribute to air pollution
and deteriorate individuals’ life expectancies. It has been found that a hydropower project with
a 100KW capacity can replace 100,000 liters of kerosene annually if the electricity is used only
for lighting.xxxviii So, more investment in hydroelectric projects would partly contribute to a
cleaner environment and would help improve people’s health. Moreover, using a renewable
source, such as water, allows non-renewable resources to be allocated to economic activities
that do not have close substitutes except for those non-renewable resources. However, the
main reason for the urgent need of RE is that majority of the villages in Nepal even at present
completely lack electricity as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.
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Since the NEA, due to financial constraints, has given up on rural electrification xxxix, PSP
is a necessity rather than an option in Nepal’s rural areas. Thus, it is significantly important to
encourage PSP in those areas. However, this is not an easy task. The profit-oriented IPPs who
can afford a proper sum of investment find RE less attractive because they are interested in
larger projects that can earn them higher profits. However, MHPs and SHPs rather than larger
projects are suitable for rural areas because those rural villages lack infrastructures required to
transmit electricity to the national grid. Most of them would have to remain as isolated grids
until the investors want to spend more money on building up the necessary infrastructures.
Even if the IPPs invest into improving the infrastructure including construction of transmission
lines in order to make their electricity available to a larger group of consumers, the other
hindrance for larger projects is the dispersed population in those rural villages that limits the
demand for electricity consumption. This would constrain large hydropower plants from
reaching their actual potential, creating inefficiency. These factors lead to lesser electricity sales
revenue and higher fixed costs. And even if the demand is plenty, then the price has to remain
within certain range because a majority of the villagers cannot afford electricity. This would
negatively affect their profit margins. Thus, the private entrepreneurs who can easily afford
small scale hydropower investment are interested in larger projects situated closer to
metropolitan areas near the national grid, from where they could use the NEA’s transmission
lines to sell electricity to the national grid.
So, the ones who are interested in RE tend to be the middle-class entrepreneurs who
can afford investment costs for relatively small-scale projects such as MHPs and SHPs. These
entrepreneurs are expected to invest not just on hydropower plants construction, but also on
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the construction of transmission lines in order to supply the electricity to the village residents.
They can hardly afford to build up a hydropower plant and run it, least yet building up
transmission lines. Furthermore, the project sizes may not be reasonable to spend huge sum of
money on constructing transmission lines. This just makes RE less appealing to private
investors. Thus, although the government has been making special provisions from MHPs and
SHPs as mentioned under the subsection 2.3, it could make RE more attractive by financing the
transmission lines for isolated grids even just in the rural villages and other close areas so that
the IPPs have possibilities of earning more electricity sales revenue. Lessons could be learned
from a case study concerning Guatemala (as discussed in the subsection 3.3), where the
government allocates a certain portion of its privatization revenue towards subsidies or other
facilities to IPPs interested in rural electrification. The Nepalese government, as mentioned
earlier, could also provide grants and subsidies, along with negotiating with various multilateral
agencies to provide loans with low interest rates to the IPPs interested in RE.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Measuring Efficiency of Hydropower Plants in Nepal Using Data Envelopment Analysis
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Jha and Shrestha (2006)xl

Jha and Shrestha (2006) have used input-oriented DEA on fourteen hydropower plants
over the years 2001-2004 to evaluate the efficiency of the hydropower plants owned by the
NEA. DEA sets an efficient frontier using mathematical modeling. It then assesses other NEA
hydropower plants’ relative efficiency levels by comparing their input-to-output relationship
with that of the efficiency frontier. The efficiency score ranges from 0 to 1.
The DEA under Jha and Shrestha (2006) focuses on minimizing inputs while keeping the
outputs constant. This assesses the inefficiency of NEA-owned and controlled hydropower
plants in the electricity generation sectors. The authors have ignored the output maximization
DEA because they believe outputs are normally fixed. Yet, it is hard to believe this is true.
Rather, an output-maximization DEA would have been helpful to convince that more capital
investment in R&D and technological advancements would help increase the NEA’s electricity
production. From here, we could strongly state that attracting more private funds to the
hydropower industry will be helpful by way of providing more funding for the capital upgrades
required to fill up the electricity shortage. PSP is being emphasized as a funding option for the
reasons previously discussed in the subsection 2.2. An input-oriented DEA focuses on reducing
the costs of inputs, which, in turn, reduces their opportunity costs arising from unnecessary
investments in the inputs. However, we are trying to see how Nepal’s excess energy demand
can be fulfilled, rather than how the NEA’s budget can be reduced.
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The main inputs that the authors chose were gross capacity of a power plant measured
in MW, which they considered to be fixed since it cannot be adjusted in the short run; annual
expenditure for operation and management (henceforth O&M) inputs measured in Nepalese
currency – NRs; and the number of employees at hydropower plants, where all the staffs are
given equal weight. So, this tends to overestimate the outputs compared to inputs. The outputs
include the annual energy generated measured in GWh, the maximum power output by those
plants during the winter system peak and during the summer system peak, both measured in
MW. Here, all the three inputs have different measurement of units, which makes it impossible
to compare them with the outputs measured in two different units again. The authors have
missed out on explaining how they carried out an input-to-output ratio analysis with those
varying units of consideration.
The overall average efficiency of all the NEA hydropower plants considered is 50%,
their mean technical efficiency is 74% and their scale efficiency is 71%. xli We should be
aware of the huge loss to the Nepalese economy, when this efficiency score is applied to
the 58.76% of the total electricity provided just by the NEA hydropower plants. NEA can
increase its technical efficiency up to 100% without sacrificing its output level, by reducing
its input investments by 26%. Scale inefficiency surfaces from either because of surpassing
the optimal output level or due to the lack of output production and its ability to gain the
full advantage because it is far less than the optimal production level. In either case, more
efficient production methods would help increase those plants’ scale efficiencies.
This article, through the data collected, has been able to show that NEA-owned and run
hydropower plants tend to be more inefficient. However, trying to eliminate the over26

staffing problem and increasing efficiency of the plants could save the national grid much
more capital that it could invest in more plants which would then increase electricity supply
in general.

3.2 Private Micro-Hydropower and Associated Investments in Nepal: The Barpak Village Case
and Broader Issues
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Ghale, Shrestha and
deLucia (2000) xlii

Ghale, Shrestha and deLucia (2000) present a case for PSP in Nepal’s rural areas. They
have supported their ideas using the results from a private MHP in a rural village of Nepal –
namely Barpak village. They portray both direct and indirect benefits, along with direct costs of
a basic MHP in a rural area. The private investor of the Barpak electrification happens to be one
of the authors of this article – Bir Bahadur (henceforth, Bahadur).
The authors portray the picture of rural areas like Barpak, and how these areas often
lack very basic infrastructure, including transportation and communication. Only a small
percentage of the population residing in the country’s rural areas has access to electricity
supply either from the national grid or self-generation. However, a lot of villages still do not
have access to electricity mainly because the NEA’s transmission lines do not reach those areas.
Barpak is one of such villages. Electricity in Barpak was introduced for the first time through
Bahadur’s initiative of micro-hydropower that started delivering electricity from August 1991
onwards.
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This private initiative was already delivered in 1991, whereas all the policies and other
articles we have considered for this thesis state that privatization of energy sector began only
from the year 1992. This article states that de-licensing of all micro-hydropower schemes and
related sales took place in 1984. In addition to this, the Nepalese government started providing
micro-hydropower credits and partial subsidies for electrification equipment from 1985.
Although the energy sector privatization began before 1992, it was only limited to MHPs. So,
this article agrees that benefits of the 1992 legislation has led to the privatization of a lot of
formerly NEA-managed mini and small-hydropower based in isolated grids. This was mainly
because it was getting very expensive for the national electricity grid to spend its scarce
resources in RE because they had to provide electricity to most of those rural areas at almost
half of the average retail tariff.xliii They could not afford to continue this any longer, especially
since even the urban areas were starting to face heavy load shedding schedules. Another
reason for the privatization of NEA’s grids in those rural areas was because private schemes are
profit-oriented. So, the private MHPs tend to be more cost-efficient, profit-driven which leads
to investment in technological advancements, leading to an overall improved efficiency. The
importance of PSP has increased even more since the NEA has withdrawn from RE.
This article shows the evolution of micro-hydropower schemes. People in Nepal’s rural
areas have been using horizontal water wheels called ‘ghattas’ for centuries, which is a
technology that originated from Tibet. It has been estimated that currently there exist 25,000
to 30,000 ghattas only in a lot of hilly and mountainous regions of the country. However, a
ghatta’s generating capacity is only 1 horse power, which is equivalent to only 746 Watts. This
amount of electricity is barely enough to drive grinding equipment for grain, which is one of
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their main sources of food consumption and revenue. So, they cannot afford to spend this
electricity for their daily lighting purposes. There have been efforts to improve those privately
owned ghattas, however, this is also not enough for electricity consumption. Therefore, efforts
like advanced micro-hydropower was seen to be important. This gave rise to the Barpak
electrification project.
Barpak village electrification is an example of a private micro-hydropower scheme. It is
an isolated grid; meaning, it does not sell the electricity produced from its plant to the NEA. As
stated by the article, this project has turned out to be profitable for Bahadur. Retained profits
have been mobilized towards making the already existing hydropower more cost-efficient and
productive. The project along with providing electricity sales revenue to the private
entrepreneur, has also led to additional economic development in Barpak. It has been found
that the project has transformed the village by generating and distributing electricity – direct
benefits, as well as by providing new entrepreneurial and employment opportunities for the
village residents that have been possible through the electricity provided by this project –
indirect benefits.
Although this paper has given a proper picture of the prospects and benefits of PSP in
rural areas, especially with micro-hydropower, the authors have missed out on some analysis. It
has been mentioned that during the initial year of operation, the plant capacity exceeded
domestic demand by a huge margin. This underutilization of the plant’s capacity should have
relatively increased the fixed costs. But this figure of loss has not been mentioned. Also, the
additional variable costs including the costs of construction materials, helicopter means
required to transport materials and equipment from the capital city Kathmandu to Barpak, and
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the costs of labor during necessary during the construction phase have not been measured.
This article also does not mention the direct costs for the fifty reinforced concrete poles that
were constructed after a few years of the plant’s operation, to replace the wooden ones in
order to ensure low maintenance costs and reliable power supply to the village. These factors
hinder us from getting the true measure of direct costs.
Other than just the costs, the authors ignore the measure of what percentage of the
village households now have access to electricity after the Barpak electrification started
operating since August 1991. This would help us get a picture of how efficient and useful microhydropower projects really are in cases of RE. This could also be used to measure the total
electricity revenue received from some wealthy households in the village who use extra
amounts of electricity and in return pay per unit (kWh) consumption instead of a flat rate as
paid by the rest of the villagers. This paper has ignored the measurement of this extra
electricity used. All those factors give misleading scenarios of direct and indirect costs and
benefits to the private investor. Considering the fact that it took only fifteen months for the
plant to be constructed and operated, we can say that MHPs in general are reliable to solve the
urgent energy crisis in the rural areas. This paper does not mention about this time-saving
indirect benefit either.
It should be noticed that there are no traces of indirect costs mentioned in this article.
This may be the case because one of the authors happens to be the private investor in Barpak’s
case. This makes it seem as though this paper may be biased towards showing only the positive
consequences of the project and ignoring the indirect costs. This deprives us from getting more
accurate results for the purpose of our empirical analyses in chapter 4.
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Furthermore, this article shows how even small investments in the rural areas can lead
to massive electricity and other economic benefits. The primary objective of the private
entrepreneurs investing in hydropower is to earn profit through electricity sales revenue.
However, other village residents can utilize such electricity provision in establishing small
businesses. Although such RE requires only a small percentage of what would otherwise be
required for a larger hydropower project, there is lack of PSP in Nepal’s case of rural
electrification. This is because of the lack of electricity demand which limits the revenue that
can be collected through electricity tariffs paid by the consumers in such regions. This is one of
the reasons why the government of Nepal has been trying to provide incentives to private
sectors investing in smaller hydropower projects that seem to be suitable for smaller scale of
electricity demands. Although privatization efforts in the micro-hydropower have been visible
since past few decades, there is still much that can be and should be done. One of the reasons
for the lack of PSP in RE is because those areas lack knowledgeable and experienced individuals
and organizations like NGOs and INGOs that are essential for the initiation and operation of
those projects.
Apart from the costs and benefits measures of the Barpak electrification, the authors
have provided suggestions on how to improve not just RE, but the entire national energy sector
through improved financial and technical assistances. After the Barpak example, five new MHPs
have been delivered in the region with five more in the process of being developed. This shows
that along with the benefits that the village residents received from electricity access, the
Barpak electrification was profitable to the private investor as well. PSP does not mean that the
project excludes other institutional assistances. Barpak micro-hydropower became a success as
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a result of joint financial and technological support from INGOs like ADBN and Intermediate
Technology Development Group (henceforth, ITDG), other private sources such as KMI
(Kathmandu Metal Industries) and Development Consulting Services (henceforth, DCS) and
government credit programs and subsidies. So, assistance from all those sectors is vital,
especially since the private investors who can easily afford capital investment for MHPs and
SHPs often try to fetch larger profit margins, and thus may prefer not getting involved in RE;
whereas, small scale private investors in the rural areas usually are the ones who need financial
aid. Thus, those institutions should support PSP in the RE through financial and technical
support, market assessment and development, and information dissemination.

3.3 Does Infrastructure Reform Work for the Poor? A Case Study From Guatemala
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Foster and Araujo (2004)
xliv

Foster and Araujo (2004) have presented a case study on economic and social results of
electricity privatization in Guatemala. According to the WDI, Guatemala is a lower middle
income country; whereas, Nepal is a low income country. Although they do not fall in the same
category, their income category level is close, and thus options experimented by Guatemala can
be expected to be economically viable for Nepal. Nepal’s external debt as a % of Gross National
Income (henceforth, GNI) is not as high as that of Guatemala. But if the country with higher
external debt has been able to improve its electricity sector through private investment
policies, then it is reasonable to assume such policies will help increase funding towards Nepal’s
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electricity supply as well since the NEA is already in high debt. As is the case with Nepal, the
mismatch of increasing demand of electricity with the stagnant electricity supply due to limited
funding for new investments led Guatemala to implement the electricity reform.xlv
Before Guatemala’s energy sector reform in 1996, the electricity used to be provided by
two state-owned companies: Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala (henceforth, EEGSA) and
Instituto Nacional de Electrificación (henceforth, INDE). The country’s Electricity Law of 1996
opened up opportunities for PSP in electricity market. The main objectives behind this
privatization policy were to increase investment and to improve efficiency through competition,
as are the objectives of Nepal’s electricity privatization policies that were brought into effect
starting from 1992.
This infrastructural reform divided the electricity generation responsibility between the
INDE and private investors equally at a 50-50% proportion. However, the transmission is still
operated by INDE alone. To me, this approach actually seems to enhance the process of
attracting PSP because the private entrepreneurs do not have to invest huge sums of money
into constructing transmission lines by themselves; they can rather use the ones provided by
the government electricity unit. Out of the electricity generation, transmission and distribution,
the distribution sector has been completely privatized, and is now under the control of three
private companies, namely: EEGSA - previously government unit, Distribuidora de Energía de
Oriente Sociedad Anónima (henceforth, DEORSA) and Distribuidora de Electricidad de

Occidente, Sociedad Anónima (henceforth, DEOCSA). Here, we can see that the concentration
ratio of the private firms involved is very high. This shows that the market reforms do not
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guarantee competition. In addition to this already existing high concentration ratio, the
Guatemalan government added to those three distribution firms’ monopolistic control by
allowing them to set their own electricity prices. As a result of such reforms, electricity tariffs
rose between 60% and 80%. However, the government introduced a social tariff to keep the
charges at pre-reform levels.
As a result of electricity privatization, the Guatemalan households experienced a rise in
electricity coverage from 53% in 1996 to 70% 1999. Considering the pre-privatization phase
from 1993 to 1996, and the post-privatization phase from 1996 to 1999, we notice that
electricity privatization turned out to have a massive scale of direct benefits to the residents
there. There was a noticeable rise in the number of new electricity connections at different
levels after electricity privatization: 58%, 13% and 94% increments at national, urban and rural
levels respectively. Similarly, the reform increased the probability of so far underserved
households receiving electricity connections; in this case, a rise of 89%, 84% and 123% was
noticed at national, urban and rural levels respectively. Since the 1996 electricity reform,
financial resources including privatization revenue channeled towards RE in Guatemala has
nearly tripled.
We can notice that there is one major difference between the electricity privatization
approaches taken by Guatemala and Nepal. Whereas Guatemala has privatized its entire
electricity sector, including distribution networks, the NEA still is a vertical monopoly. The IPPs
in Nepal, except for the isolated grids and the ones investing in hydropower projects lesser than
1 MW, are required to have PPAs to be able to sell electricity only through NEA. Although there
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are policies that allow private entrepreneurs to lease in government-owned electric substations
to distribute electricity, this is a minor effort compared to the complete privatization of
distribution networks. This might be one of the major reasons why Nepal has not been able to
see significant positive changes in terms of electricity supply like Guatemala.
This article shows a more balanced picture of Guatemala’s experience of electricity
privatization. On the one hand, it shows that the reform has led to huge increments in the
nation’s electrification. On the other hand, this article shows that the control of electricity price
hikes and pilferage problems are doubtful. Overall, it shows that electricity privatization
increases electricity supply which is the main concern for Nepal to reduce its electricity
shortages. The impacts of electricity privatization in Guatemala sound very encouraging for
electricity-deficient country like Nepal to take lessons from.
Although it gives strong statistical records for direct costs and benefits to the
Guatemalans, this article misses out on providing the facts and figures for the costs and
benefits that the private entrepreneurs face. This article gives us a picture to assess the pros
and cons of electricity reforms to the consumers, but tells us nothing regarding how Guatemala
managed to attract private investors in the electricity sector. Foster and Araujo (2004) also have
not provided information on indirect costs and benefits of electricity privatization that the
private firms and the Guatemalans face. This article is supposed to present a case study, which
in my opinion should give a full and clear picture of both direct and indirect costs and benefits
to the actively involved private entrepreneurs as well as Guatemala’s population.
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3.4 Global Electric Power Reform Privatization and Liberalization of the Electric Power
Industry in Developing Countries
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Bacon and Jones (2001)
xlvi

Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) mention four main reasons for electricity privatization.
One of them is poor performance of the state-owned and run electricity sectors in terms of high
costs, lack of electricity supply in some areas and unreliable power supply in the areas that do
have electricity access. The other reason is the national grid’s financial inability to invest into
advanced technologies in order to improve efficiency that would help increase energy supply,
or even just to maintain the already existing ones. Another driving force for energy privatization
is the need to mobilize the national financial resources so far devoted to energy sector, into
other investments. The last reason is to raise government revenue from the sale of its assets,
such as substations and machinery. This article reflects a larger group of economies that have
undergone electricity privations. Thus, a lot of conditions and cases mentioned by the authors
do not directly apply to Nepal’s energy situation. For example, only the first two driving forces
explain the need of increased PSP in the country.
For majority of the developing countries, before the privatization of their energy
sectors, the public grids were left without any incentive to earn higher profits because there
was no drive to compete against other players in the market. So, energy sectors were found to
be undergoing excessive costs, as in the NEA’s overstaffing case. The service quality
deteriorated and there was no motivation to increase supply. From the other literature reviews
and research, those reasons and conditions seem to reflect Nepal’s national grid’s situation.
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The authors present four models as a path towards full-reform: model 1 reflects
complete monopoly; model 2 is vertical monopoly that gives rise to competition only in the
generation sector; model 3, where distribution companies purchase electricity from the
generators they prefer leading to competition in the wholesale market but not the retail one;
model 4 is the one with competition in the retail market as well. Nepal’s energy sector has
moved on from model 1 to 2; meaning, there are plenty of rooms for further privatization of
the sector if allowed. In the process of such reforms, the IPPs should secure long-term PPAs
with the state-owned utilities to guarantee a flow of revenue. This article ignores RE since IPPs
in the rural areas are not PPA-secured because of the transmission lines not being available to
majority of the rural areas.
Benefits of electricity privatization can be noticed from the following table, where the
authors have extracted information on how electricity privatization has brought changes in the
four South American electricity distribution companies. The data include information from
different years of privatization until 1998:
TABLE 3.4.1, source: Bacon and Jones (2001). Page 17.
Determinant

Peru (b)

Argentina (c)

Argentina Edenor

Chile Chilectra

Year privatized

1994

1992

1992

1987

Energy sales (GWh/year)

+19%

+79%

+82%

+26%

Energy losses (%)

-50%

-68%

-63%

-70%

No. of employees

-43%

-60%

-63%

-9%
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The above data that show the rise in energy sales, reduction in the energy losses and
the number of employees seem to solve Nepal’s problems of electricity shortages, electricity
losses through pilferages and overstaffing. So, this is makes a convincing argument for the need
of PSP in Nepal’s electricity distribution sectors as well; this may help increase efficiencies in
electricity distribution as well along with its generation, and thus increase electricity supply as
shown by the above numbers. Especially for developing countries where supply costs > revenue
as in the NEA’s casexlvii, the authors suggest their distribution sectors to be privatized too.
According to them, this would help attract more PSP since there are more buyers for the power
generated through PSP.
Also, electricity reforms should be determined by some level of government guidance.
As with New Zealand’s case, privatization without any form of State governance resulted in
electricity tariff hikes that ultimately forced the government to put price controls on power
suppliers. Political instability highly influences the level of reform possibility. Thus, in order to
attract more PSP, the government should guarantee safeguarding investments and provide
proper tariff and licensing incentives.
The authors give more priority to how benefits can be achieved from privatizing
distribution sectors rather than generation and transmission ones. This may be ignoring the fact
that distribution is possible only through increased generation. It is concerned with the
secondary supply to consumers rather than the primary supply to the distributors themselves.
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3.5 Synthesis
In this section, we will consider the articles used in our literature review from
subsections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Authors of all the four articles agree that publicly owned and
controlled energy sectors tend to limit electricity supply due to management inefficiencies and
limited financial sources. Among these, some provide concrete evidences through calculations
and some just refer to examples of other nations’ energy sector privatization experiences. For
example, unlike other articles, 3.1 offers partial mathematical evidence that the governmentowned and controlled hydropower plants in Nepal are inefficient.
Whereas 3.1 mentions NEA’s inefficiency in operating its hydropower plants as the
major cause for the existing electricity shortages in Nepal, the rest of the articles provide PSP in
the energy sector as a solution to increase electricity supply in Nepal. Whereas 3.1 and 3.2 limit
their views to PSP in Nepal’s energy sector, the other two articles extrapolate results from
other countries’ electricity privatization experiences. 3.3 and 3.4 portray the difficulties in the
path of PSP, along with showing that the consequences of PSP may not always result as
expected. For example, Guatemala- a country comparable to Nepal roughly in terms of income
category according to the WDI, had experienced unprecedented increases in electricity demand
accompanied by the inefficient energy supply arising from the public sector. Thus Guatemala
privatized its entire energy sector expecting to increase electricity supply through competition.
It was successful in increasing electricity supply, but at the cost of price hikes. A lesson we can
learn from their experience is that PSP does not necessarily lead to greater competition. Also
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the last two articles make strong cases for privatization of electricity distribution sectors as
well.
The cases under 3.1 and 3.2 provide a biased picture to make arguments “for” electricity
privatization. Whereas, the case under 3.1 shows the inefficiency of the NEA’s hydropower
plants, it does not mention how it compares to the efficiency level of the ones that are privately
owned and controlled. The case under 3.2 mentions benefits, however it does not disclose any
kind of indirect costs. Although, it is assumed that MHPs have very minimal economic and
environmental costs, it is hard to believe they are free of indirect costs. The last two articles
portray an unbiased picture of privatization by addressing both the benefits and costs based on
the experiences of the countries that have undergone electricity privatization to some extent or
another. Overall, the authors of all the articles found and used in this thesis support the
research hypothesis by directly or indirectly proposing increased PSP to be the solution to
Nepal’s energy crisis.
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Case Study on a Private Micro-hydropower Project in Barpak village, Nepal – Rural
Electrification
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Ghale, Shrestha and
deLucia (2000) xlviii

This is a brief cost-benefit study of one of the private MHPs that was established in
Barpak village as mentioned in the subsection 3.2. The Barpak village is located in the Gorkha
district of Nepal, from where it takes close to two days walking to get to the nearest road. The
village did not have access to electricity until it was introduced in 1991 through this MHP
initiative by Bahadur. Barpak is a relatively large village according to the Nepalese standards. If
this comparatively higher standard village lacked electricity access even until the early 1990’s,
we can imagine the conditions of other lower standard villages to be even worse. The fact that
82.28% of Nepal’s population still resides in such rural conditions alarms the need for RE.
The construction of this project started in April of 1990 and ended in June of 1991.
Operations began since August 1991. This plant began with an installed capacity of 50 KW. To
start the project, Bahadur had obtained a loan worth 1.15 million Nepali Rupees (henceforth,
NRs) from the Asian Development Bank, Nepal (henceforth, ADBN). Additionally, Bahadur
received a grant worth NRs. 0.49 million from Nepal’s electrification subsidy program. The total
cost of the project was estimated at NRs. 1.9 million, and the terms for the loan were
determined at an annual interest rate of 15% and a repayment period of 7 years. The loan
contract stipulated that the interest rates were subject to change as per ADBN’s judgment,
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charged by the ADBN at the end of the construction, and the principal was to be paid back once
the project would start generating electricity sales revenue. At the time of construction, the
interest rate increased to 19%, and later it lowered to 17%. So, we will consider 17%, since the
interest and capital payments were to begin after the completion of the plant construction. We
will now use CBA to analyze if Bahadur’s investment on Barpak village electrification really was
profitable or not. Following are a set of assumptions and figures we know of in relation to direct
costs and benefits associated with the Barpak project:
Present Values (Discounted Values) of direct costs incurred for the Barpak Village
Electrification Case:
1. PV of the loan obtained from ADBN:
Time period = 7 years; interest rate = 17%; monthly loan installments = NRs. 18,000 
yearly loan repayments = NRs. 216,000. Interest rate as demanded by the ADBN has
already been incorporated in the loan installment payments that the private investor
makes each year; therefore, here we consider the discount rate to be the investor’s
opportunity cost for borrowing from ADBN instead of some other banks. Other banks’
lending interest rate in 1990, according to the WDI, was 14.42%. Since the investor
makes the same payment over the 7 years, it is an annuity. For annuity, we need to
consider the PV of annuity of $1 factor, which can be calculated using the
formula: [1-1/(1+r)^n]/r.
So, at interest rate of 14.42%, i.e., r = 0.1442, PV of annuity of $1 factor
= [1-1/(1+0.1442)^7]/0.1442
= 4.234 (corrected to 3 decimal places)
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Therefore,
PV of loan
= payment * PV of annuity of $1 factor
= 216,000 * 4.234
= negative NRs. 914,544 since this is a cash outflow

2. PV of the land sold: negative NRs. 840,000. Since this cost took place at the time of
construction, it is not a future cash outflow. Therefore, we do not need to discount the
value.
3. PV of plant fixation cost (incurred once): The plant was damaged by lighting, and
therefore had to be fixed for the cost of NRs. 400,000. The article does not mention
when it was repaired. However, it does mention that the plant had to be repaired after
it started operating, which was 1991, and was fixed by 1994. Therefore, time period to
consider = 3 years (1994-1991); discount rate once again is the deposit interest rate
because had the investor not have to spend on the repair, he would have deposited it in
a bank and earned an interest rate of 11.92%.
Therefore, PV of plant fixation cost= 400,000/(1+0.1192)^3 = NRs. 285,323.07.

4. PV of the operating labor cost: Here, the time period that needs to be considered is
infinity, and the salary to be regarded is the same because the article has not mentioned
for how long the investor will have to pay the same amount of salary to the employees
who are managing the plant. Discount rate = deposit interest rate = 11.92%.
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Therefore, PV of operating labor cost = 48,000/0.1192 = NRs. 402,684.56.

Present Values (Discounted Values) of direct benefits incurred for the Barpak Village
Electrification Case:
1. PV of the operating benefit from the electricity sales revenue: Here time period to be
considered is infinity, and the amount of revenue is regarded to be constant every year
because the article has not mentioned about how long the same revenue will keep
flowing in. The interest rate = deposit interest rate in order to have consistency with
most of the PV of costs calculated above. We will discount the revenue to their net
present value like we discount perpetual bonds due to their continuous nature.
Therefore, the PV of the electricity sales revenue = 276,000/0.1192 = NRs. 2,315,436.24.
List of all direct costs:
1. PV of the loan obtained from ADBN = NRs. 914,544
2. PV of the land sold = NRs. 840,000
3. PV of plant fixation cost = NRs. 285,323.07
4. PV of the operating labor cost = NRs. 402,684.56
Total PV of direct costs = NRs. (914,544 + 840,000 + 285,323.07 + 402,684.56) = NRs.
2,442,551.63
List of all direct benefits:
1. PV of the operating benefit from the electricity sales revenue = NRs. 2,315,436.24
Total PV of direct benefits = NRs. 2,315,436.24
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Therefore, according to the above information regarding direct costs and benefits, the
discounted net direct benefits would be as follows:
Discounted Net Direct Benefits = PV of all the direct benefits – PV of all the direct costs =
NRs. (2,315,436.24 – 2,442,551.63) = - NRs. 127,115.39.

This project is not profitable since the discounted net present benefit is negative. Also, due
to the negative operating cash flows for the initial 7 years (loan repayment + operating
costs exceed the operating revenue), this project’s payback period is in tens of years.xlix

Limitations concerning the above cost-benefit analysis:
The results from our CBA conflict with the conclusion provided by the authors of the
article on the Barpak project. The authors state that this private MHP had been running
profitably. However, we need to consider that this article does not give enough information to
calculate capital depreciation, the cost of plant improvement that took place after the plant
fixation and revenue collected from wealthier households who paid per unit KWh for electricity
rather than the cheap flat monthly rate as paid by the rest of the households.
Whereas there are no traces of indirect costs, the authors do mention limited indirect
benefits of the project. The Barpak village is known for its educational facilities that range from
primary to secondary schooling. The fulfilling of electricity demands in the village’s households
has also provided lighting for after-dark hours studying. Before the delivery of the private
micro-hydropower in August 1991, the main source of income residing in Barpak used to be
from army services, animal husbandry and agriculture. After 1991, the electricity availability
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gave rise to other forms of economic activities. Four specific sectors included a grain mill driven
by electric motor, a furniture workshop using power tools, a bakery using an electric oven, and
a business making traditional Nepali paper utilizing an electric boiler and an electric beater. All
those additional economic activities increased the variety of employment opportunities for the
village residents. Since the benefits have only been mentioned, but lack numbers and figures,
there is no basis to calculate the figure for indirect benefits either.
It might be the case that the missing information on benefits outweighs the missing
costs. This means that the CBA results may have a profit picture for this project as mentioned
by the article. I assume this is the case because I believe that no private entrepreneur would
want to invest in a project that is already known to be running a loss as shown by the above
CBA.

4.2 A Case Study on the Khimti Hydropower Project
The Khimti Hydropower Project (henceforth, KHP) is Nepal’s first private hydropower
project operated under the BOOT technique. It is located 100km east of Kathmandu – the
capital city. It is located between two rural districts of Nepal - Ramechhap and Dolakha. For
Dolakha, the average population as of 1991 was 79.1 persons /sq. km, and the closest urban
centre was Kathmandu – which is 132km away. Agriculture is the major source of income and it
provides employment to 63.83% of the actively employed population.l For Ramechhap, as of
2008, this district’s population was 211824li; meaning 0.74% of Nepal’s total population which
was at that time 28.8 million inhabitants, according to the WDI. From this total population, only
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55% are considered economically active, a majority of which heavily relies upon agricultural
production for a living.lii Both the districts severely lack transportation facilities.
So, KHP is an example of rural electrification on a larger scale that has not only extended
its direct and indirect benefits to the rural areas nearby, but has also added 350 GWh of annual
electricity supply to the national grid. liii Its installed capacity of 60MW is supported by the
Khimti river. The power station construction began in June 1996 and ended in July 2000. Its
capital cost of $140 million was financed by Nepal’s Butwal Power Company Limited
(henceforth, BPC) and Norway’s Statkraft. liv Himal Power Limited (henceforth, HPL) was
established in 1992 to promote the KHP project using BOOT method that had a license from the
Nepalese government for fifty years.lv
As any other plant construction phase, KHP construction also required power supply.
However, there was no electricity grid in the project area, because of which the construction of
a SHP of 500KW took place, namely Jhankre Rural Electrification and Development Project
(henceforth, JREDP). Before the KHP construction started, none of the Village Development
Committees (henceforth, VDCs) in the project area had access to electricity.lvi Most households
used home-made kerosene lamps to meet their lighting needs. However, the establishment of
the JREDP, led by KHP, provided electrification in the area. The first three years of JREDP’s
operation had fulfilled lighting needs of 300 households, and had helped establish seven smallscale electricity based enterprises.lvii Extending from the outcomes delivered by this SHP, we
can expect that hydropower plants with larger capacity would be able to provide electricity to
thousands of Nepalese households and industries.
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KHP’s PPA with the NEA is valid for twenty years, although the BOOT license has been
granted for fifty years. After the PPA period, NEA gets 50% ownership over the project,
whereas after the fifty years’ license expiration, the entire project will be transferred to the
government. The PPA period may be renewed, but nothing has been found that directs to
whom and at what rates will the electricity be sold at after this period expires.
KHP has been considered to be one of the most environmentally friendly projects till
date. Along with introducing electricity to a lot of villages in those districts, it had other indirect
benefits too, primary reason being, to maintain good relationships with the residents there in
order to avoid any delays during the construction phase, and to avoid any damages during its
operation phase. During the construction phase, the total number of village work force reached
to 4,000. One of the major indirect benefits included the establishment of Khimti Community
and Environment Unit (KECU) that was responsible to improve education, health and sanitation,
and vocational training for women’s self-employment. This unit also focused on forest
conservation; 84,000 seedlings were planted in places affected by deforestation and
agricultural techniques were improved through technical advancement trainings to about 4,600
farmers.lviii
One of the important lessons to learn from KHP is that maintaining good public relations
with the local communities may help minimize unnecessary delays in production due to strikes,
or local people’s dissatisfaction due to private investors’ interference in their communities.
Avoiding such delays help to keep the projects’ costs low. Moreover, the total expense of KECU
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was less than 1% of the total project cost. lix Thus, why not take up the small cost in return for
greater benefits?
Due to lack of data availability, it is not possible to conduct a CBA for KHP. However, a
few direct and indirect costs and benefits for this project are mentioned in the exhibit A.IX in
the appendix. Overall, this project portrays the direct and indirect benefits that a medium-scale
hydropower in rural areas can have. Although the annual production of 350GWh energy is
transmitted to the NEA, SHPs that may be constructed to facilitate larger hydropower projects:
JREDP in KHP’s case can be used to electrify the villages that have never had electricity before.
Thus, RE could be a part of larger projects. It is to be noticed that a huge portion of capital
investment was contributed by foreign private investors as displayed in the exhibit A.IX in the
appendix. Thus, PSP from foreign sectors should be attracted towards Nepal’s energy sector
because the domestic private investors alone cannot afford huge hydropower projects.

4.3 Financial and Economic Analysis of Micro-Hydro Power in Nepal
More than just introducing electricity into the rural areas of Nepal, the goal should be to
sustain and attract further investments, which is possible through earned profits. Here, we
continue to defend the case “for” privatization compared to other sources of funding.
Extending the results of comparison between private and communal investments as well, we
will see that privately- owned and controlled MHP tends to be more beneficial to the investors
than the community-owned and controlled MHPs. This is mainly because private investments
allow the investors appropriate all the profits for themselves and be held responsible for the
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risks of any losses. The net present values for Angakhola MHP, Daunekhola MHP and
Tikhedhunga MHP were +$703, -($20,884) and –($60,706) respectively.lx These figures show the
private investment to be profitable and the rest to be at loss. Although all the projects are
economically desirable to improve living standards of the rural residents, only Angakhola MH is
financially viable. Considering the fact that even without grant and lesser subsidy compared the
last two projectslxi, the private investment is profitable. Thus, increased subsidies and grants to
PSP would help increase electricity supply in Nepal’s rural areas.

CHAPTER 5: LIMITATIONS
This thesis has a few limitations in itself. No DEA on private hydropower projects could
be found and thus, we could not really compare the performances of hydropower plants owned
and controlled by the government vs. the ones owned and operated by private investors. Had
we seen positive results from DEA on the privately owned and run hydropower plants, the case
“for” more PSP in Nepal’s energy sector would be even stronger. Moreover, the DEA used is
input-oriented which only points out the production side inefficiencies such as overstaffing, or
lack of incentives among management staff. This supports privatization for the generation
sector. However, in order to argue for extension of PSP towards the distribution sectors as well,
and to learn lessons from Guatemala’s electricity privatization that led to an increase in its
electricity supply, we need to see how inefficient the NEA plants are based on an outputoriented DEA as well. An output-oriented DEA that would highlight NEA’s distribution
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inefficiencies along with its inability to control electricity pilferages due to NEA’s carelessness
would help make a case for introduction of PSP in the distribution sectors too. However,
attention needs to be given that electricity privatization does not necessarily eliminate
problems of electricity tariff hikes and continued electricity pilferages as observed from
Guatemala’s case.
The case study on the Barpak village electrification does not portray all the costs and
benefits which restricts its CBA from giving a true picture of whether the project was profitable
or not. CBA for KHP could not be calculated due to lack of availability of data. If we had the
results for KHP’s profitability, it would have helped to set this project as an example to
encourage more PSP into medium-scale hydropower projects, along with considering RE as a
part of such projects.
This thesis lacks information on Nepal’s national budget allocation for its energy sector.
All we know is that the NEA has readily agreed for the need to increase domestic and foreign
PSP in the rural and urban electricity generation sector mainly due to its financial constraints.
Had we known this missing piece of information, the extent of the energy sector failure would
be clearer. This would also show the national budget’s opportunity cost of investing in the
unpromising energy sector. If this failure and thus opportunity cost is severe, then the need for
extension of PSP in Nepal’s electricity sector would be more persuasive.
It was difficult to choose the most reliable source. In any case of confusion, we have
dealt with information published by the Nepali authorities and journal articles over the ones
provided by multilateral organizations and other online websites.
51

CONCLUSION
Out of the continuous growth of electricity demand in Nepal, the major segment
comprises of domestic consumers. The current domestic electricity consumption consists of
95.48% of the total energy demand.lxii However, the domestic sector contributes to only 42.52%
of total electricity sales, whereas the industrial sector that makes up only 1.71% of the total
energy demand contributes to 37.37% of such electricity sales.lxiii This shows that Nepal’s
domestic category is deprived of electricity compared to its industrial categories. This, in a way,
denotes that areas with industrial development, which happen to be at or near the major urban
cities of Nepal, have more electricity supply compared to the rural areas. Such concentration of
electricity supply near the cities can be noticed from the exhibit A.IV in the appendix as well,
where the biggest red area in the centre is Nepal’s capital city. It is extremely important to note
that currently 82.28% of Nepal’s total population resides in rural areas. As mentioned before,
the IEA report 2008 shows that compared to 89.7% of the urban households electrification rate,
only 34% of the rural households had electricity access. This should have called for more
attention towards RE since the NEA is a government-owned and controlled utility and still holds
a vertical monopoly; its goal should be to make public provision – in this case electricity,
accessible to majority of its population if not to all. Even more tragically, the annual report of
NEA 2009 mentions that the national grid has given up on RE due to its financial constraints.
Hence, to make electricity accessible to the majority of the population, PSP is a necessity rather
than an option in the case of RE since the government is not planning to be directly involved
anymore, except through subsidies, grants and policy amendments favorable to attract private
investments towards the country’s rural areas.
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Including the metropolitan areas, a lot of the MHPs are also situated in the Terai regions
of the country. Terai is the most popular region for agricultural production in the entire
country. Private investors’ main goal is to earn profits, either directly through electricity sales
revenue, or indirectly through using the plants’ forced water to run agro-processing units in
order to increase efficiency. Out of three major horizontal divisions of the country, Terai is the
lowest region. This region also has various small scale industries resulting from agro-businesses
that consume electricity to run those firms and machinery to increase efficiency. Hence, the
markets that demand more electricity tend to attract private investors. This can be seen from
the exhibit A.IV in the appendix.
As of 2008, a total of 2,496 micro-hydro systems had been installed in forty districts
generating a total of 17.03 MW.lxiv However, this figure is negligible if compared to Nepal’s total
hydropower capacity. If RE is assisted by government subsidies to make it look profitable, then
new entrants can be attracted relatively more easily. The Nepalese government allows
monopoly to the IPPs interested in RE by allowing only a single IPP to operate in a particular
rural region as mentioned in the subsection 2.3. In addition to such monopolistic power, these
IPPs are allowed to fix their own electricity tariffs. PSP in Barpak village electrification can be
taken as an example, to attract more private investors into MHPs.
Run of the river type of projects already dominate Nepal’s hydropower industry. lxv This
is reasonable because of Nepal’s hilly terrain and abundance of southwards flowing rivers as
mentioned in the subsection 2.1. As researched, most if not all private hydropower projects so
far connected to the national grid are run of the river type of hydropower projects. Along with
the slow growth of PSP in Nepal’s energy sector, the dominance of the run of the river type of
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hydropower systems partly explains the reason the nation has declared periods of national
energy crises even after partially privatizing its energy sector. Out of the country’s total
installed capacity of 564,915 KW, only 0.017% is contributed by storage type of hydropower
plants, the rest is covered by run of the river schemes.lxvi In order to reduce the seasonal
electricity shortages that are more severe, PSP needs to be attracted towards pumped storage
types of hydropower systems. This requires construction of dams unlike the case of run of the
river hydropower projects; this calls for foreign private investments since the domestic is not
enough for huge investments. Private investors might not be very keen in such huge capital
costs since they are required to transfer the entire project to the Nepalese government without
receiving any compensation at the end of the license period; instead, they have to buy back the
plants they established if they would like to continue with the same project.lxvii Thus, the
government may want to market its extendable license policies. However, in most of the rural
areas, dam construction may not be a good idea not only because of high capital costs, but also
because of their rugged infrastructure that may be prone to floods and landslides during the
construction phase. Thus, MHPs still remain to be a better option for RE, and pumped storage
projects to fulfill urban electricity demands.
Encouraging more PSP does not mean limiting other options such as any other forms of
support from foreign nations and multilateral organizations. However, as discussed in the
subsection 2.2, both the neighboring economies of Nepal - China and India have already
privatized their energy sectors. India has completely privatized its electricity generation,
transmission and distribution sectors. Although China has not explored fast privatization, it has
the world’s largest electricity generating dam with 32 generators totaling its installed capacity
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to 22.5 GW.lxviii Hence, Nepal’s political and thus economic instability may not attract China’s
capital inflow. As far as India is concerned, capital inflow would have to come from private
sectors since the energy sector has been privatized. Options of grants and loans from
multilateral organizations are too expensive not just because of their high interest rates, but
also due to various strings attached to their financial aid package.
There was a rise in PSP only during the first few years after the implementation of
electricity privatization policies, after which it slowed down.lxix We can see this slow progress
even in the past decade from table A.V in the appendix. The reason for this trend has not been
explored; however, what we know is the progress in PSP needs to be boosted if we are to
introduce electricity to rural areas and to reduce the routine load shedding hours in the urban
areas that already have access to electricity. An investor-friendly environment could be created
by reducing political instability, along with more policies favoring PSP in the energy sector. The
government could reduce the amount of royalty charged on larger hydropower projects too
until Nepal’s energy sector has a strong long-term energy development base. If not, then a
portion of such royalties should be allocated towards RE as in Guatemala’s case.
For the private hydropower projects that get loans from multilateral agencies, the
payments to loans are to be made in the US dollars. If such PSPs are isolated from the NEA grid
as in the cases of most REs such as the Barpak village electrification, then no PPAs are required.
However, if they are connected to the national grid and thus transmit electricity to NEA, then
they are required to fix PPAs with the NEA. In such cases, PPAs are pegged against the US$ since
the loan repayments to various multilateral organizations take place in this currency’s form.
This means that NRs. devaluation against the US$ causes the nominal payment of the loans and
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interests on it to rise. Just over the time period of ten years, NRs. devalued against US$ from
NRs. 20 = US$1 to NRs. 75 = US$1.lxx Such Nepalese currency devaluation might make the
private investors more skeptical on investing in a country where economic stability is a
question. Thus, once again, the government should be able to safeguard both domestic and
foreign PSPs in the energy sector.
One of the major reasons behind the reduction in electricity is the electricity pilferage
problem that NEA faces. Electricity is stolen at the distribution phase. Such theft represented a
significant portion of Nepal’s total energy loss of about 25% in the year 2005.lxxi Thus, the NEA
should allow privatization of electricity at distribution levels too since private investors tend to
be more careful about their investment’s profitability. Also, if we are talking about increasing
electricity supply through competition, then privatization should be extended to distribution
levels rather than just limiting it to generation phases.
The fact that although introducing PSP in Nepal’s energy sector only about two decades
ago, the IPPs currently contribute 29.56% towards the country’s total electricity supply is
outstanding. Nepal should learn from its own experimentation of increasing electricity supply
through the introduction of PSP in its energy sector. Furthermore, lessons should be taken from
countries like Guatemala and other four South American electricity companies discussed in the
subsection 3.4; they managed to increase electricity supply through privatization of their
electricity distribution sectors. As we have seen from above discussions, market reforms do not
necessarily lead to competition. As a result, electricity prices may rise tremendously as in
Guatemala’s case. However, since Nepal, at least currently, is not in a bargaining position with
the IPPs, instead of interfering with limiting the concentration ratio of the firms or with the
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electricity tariffs, the government should rather provide subsidies to its consumers in order to
reduce the burden of electricity tariff hikes that may result from privatizing Nepal’s electricity
distribution sectors. Such subsidies could be extracted from tax revenues and varying amounts
of royalty collected from IPPs as shown by the tables A.I and A.II in the appendix.
It would be nearly impossible to find any developmental strategy without any defects.
As most of the articles, conjectures and empirical analyses in this thesis suggest, although
electricity privatization may come with some costs, this measure will help to increase Nepal’s
electricity supply. Therefore, the hypothesis of this thesis: ‘increased PSP in the electricity
sector will help Nepal increase its electricity supply’ is true. Thus, PSP in Nepal’s electricity
sector should be extended further.
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APPENDIX
Table A.I
For domestic electricity sales oriented hydropower projects
Electricity Capacity

Up to 15 years

After 15 years

Annual capacity

Energy royalty,

Annual capacity

Energy royalty,

royalty, per KW

per KWh

royalty, per KW

per KWh

1 MW – 10 MW

Rs. 100/-

1.75%

Rs. 1,000/-

10%

10 MW – 100 MW

Rs. 150/-

1.85%

Rs. 1,200/-

10%

Above 100 MW

Rs. 200/-

2.00%

Rs. 1,500/-

10%

For captive use

Rs. 1,500/-

Rs. 3,000/-

Source: "6.13.1 Royalty." The Hydropower Development Policy, 2001. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Nov.
2010. <www.doed.gov.np/policy/hydropower_development_policy_2001.pdf>. Page 26

Note: Here, if the excess electricity from captive is sold to the NEA, the energy royalty is
charged as for the ones above 100 MW.
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Table A.II
For export-oriented hydropower projects
Type

Up to 15 years

After 15 years

Annual capacity

Energy royalty,

Annual capacity

Energy royalty,

royalty, per KW

per KWh

royalty, per KW

per KWh

Run-of-the-river

Rs. 400/-

7.5%

Rs. 1,800/-

12%

Storage

Rs. 500/-

10%

Rs. 2,000/-

15%

Source: "6.13.1 Royalty." The Hydropower Development Policy, 2001. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Nov.
2010. <www.doed.gov.np/policy/hydropower_development_policy_2001.pdf>. Page 26
Exhibit A.III – Basic Run of the River Hydropower Mechanism

Source: Dhungel, Prateek. "Financial Analysis." Financial and Economic Analysis of Micro-Hydro
Power in Nepal. N/A: Master of Science Paper from The University of Minnesota, 2009. Page 6.
Print.
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Exhibit A.IV – Map of Nepal

Source: Dhungel, Prateek. "Financial Analysis." Financial and Economic Analysis of Micro-Hydro
Power in Nepal. N/A: Master of Science Paper from The University of Minnesota, 2009. Page 39.
Print.
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Table A.V
Particulars

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Peak

351.9

391

426

470.33

515.24

557.53

603.28

648.39

721.73

812.50

demand
(MW)
Available

1701.45 1868.42 2066.45

2261.13 2380.89

2642.75

2780.92 3051.82 3185.95

3130.77

Hydro

1233.22 1113.36 1113.13

1478.04 1345.46

1522.9

1568.55 1747.42 1793.14

1839.52

Thermal

66.73

27.14

17.01

4.4

9.92

13.669

16.1

9.06

Purchase

401.5

727.93

936.31

778.69

1025.519 1106.184

1196.27 1291.09 1383.64

1282.19

India

232.2

226.54

238.29

149.88

186.675

241.389

266.23

328.83

425.22

356.45

Nepal

169.3

501.38

698.02

628.81

838.844

864.795

930.04

962.26

958.42

925.74

∆ in IPP’s

-

+332.08 +196.64

-69.21

+210.03

+25.951

+65.25

+32.22

-3.84

-32.68

energy
(GWh)

13.31

9.17

(total)

contribution
(GWh)
Source: Nepal Electricity Authority, A Year in Review, Fiscal Year 2008/09. Kathmandu: Nepal
Electricity Authority, 2009. Page 76. Print.
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Graphs A.VI and A.VII have been constructed by the author of this thesis by extracting statistical
information provided by the WDI: "World Databank." World Databank. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Nov.
2010. <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2>.
Graph A.VI
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Here, we can see that starting from the year of electricity privatization (1996), the
consumption by Nepal’s households has significantly increased. However, this shows an
overall picture, and thus does not show the lack of electricity in Nepal’s rural areas. This
graph supports the thesis hypothesis by showing the rise in electricity consumption by
the Nepalese households.
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Graph A.VII
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The above shows that PSP in energy sector helps nations increase its total electricity supply. For
Guatemala, the reform year was 1996, and for Nepal it was 1992. The slopes noticeably start
becoming steeper starting from those years. Although Guatemala privatized later than Nepal,
we can see that the electricity production in Guatemala has managed to increase faster than in
Nepal. This may be due to the difference in electricity privatization levels; Guatemala has
privatized its generation as well as distribution sectors, whereas Nepal has limited the
privatization to its generation sector. This also directs towards the need to extend PSP in
Nepal’s energy sector.
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Exhibit A.IX (Khimti Hydropower Project)
Figures for direct costs (all in millions of US$):

1. Total cost = 140 million [Source: "Description." Nepal: Building Water Infrastructure As
Part of Khimti I Hydropower Project (KHP-I), Case # 191. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Nov.
2010. Page 1. <http://www.jvs-nwp.org.np/publications/Number%20%2023.pdf>.

2. 22-km access road to Khimti I was financed by His Majesty’s Government of Nepal. The
figure for this cost has not been mentioned. [Source: Honningsvag, B, G. H. Midttomme,
K. Repp, K. Vaskinn, and T. Westeren. Hydropower in the new millenium: proceedings
of the 4th International Conference on Hydropower Development, Hydropower '01,
Bergen, Norway, 20-22 June 2001. Lisse, Netherlands: A.A. Balkema, 2001. Page 4. Print]

3. Equity capital of HPL = 34.1 million [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn
and Westeren (2001). Page 5]

4. Quasi equity (loans from international banks that were convertible to shares) = 9
million [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5]

5. Statkraft’s capital investment = 25.1 million out of 34.1 million. 2-5 million each were
contributed by BPC, Alston power, GE Energy and NDF [Source: Honningsvag,
Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5]
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6. ADB + IFC + NORAD + Eksportfinans loans = 92.6 million [Source: Honningsvag,
Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5]

7. Quasi-equity from ADB + IFC = 3 million [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp,
Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5]

8. Overall loan to equity ratio = 70:30 [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn
and Westeren (2001). Page 5]

9. Maintenance grant: Finland had contributed $20 million to construct the 100 km KhimtiKathmandu transmission line. [Source: Sharma, Sudhindra, Juhani Koponen, Annette
Skovsted Hansen, and Tatsuro Fujikura. Partnershi in Action, Nordic and Japanese Aid
in Nepal . Stockholm: Paper from The European Institute of Japanese Studies, Stockholm
School of Economics, Stockholm , 2005. Page 25. Print.]

Figures for direct benefits (all in millions of US$):
10. Annual supply = 350 GWh. This was divided into 104 GWh during the dry period
(November to April) and 246 GWh during the remaining 6 months. During the dry
periods, monthly supply sums up to 13-27 GWh = 13,000,000 – 27,000,000 KWh. During
the wet seasons, monthly supply sums up to 39-42 GWH = 39,000,000 – 42,000,000
KWh. [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5]
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11. Normal electricity tariff charged by Khimti = 5.49 cents per KWh = US$0.0549 per KWh
[Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5]

12. During the dry and wet periods, the excess supply is charged at 8.5 cents and 4.2 cents
respectively. [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001).
Page 5]
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